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Kampourakis’s commentary rightly argues for the importance of interdisciplinary dis-
cussion among experts in conceptual development, science education, and the history and
philosophy of science. Indeed, we viewed our paper (Ware & Gelman, 2014) as providing
a valuable intersection between conceptual development and science education research,
and hope that this exchange will encourage further such cross-discipline conversations.
Kampourakis takes issue with our usage of three terms: “Darwinian,” “Lamarckian,”
and “teleological.” We address each of these concerns in turn. First, Kampourakis points
out that we incorrectly implied that Darwin attributed evolution to “gene recombination
and chance mutations.” In fact, although individual variation was a critical element in
Darwin’s model, he did not accurately postulate the source of this variation or the mecha-
nisms of inheritance. This knowledge did not emerge until later, with advances in fields
such as molecular biology and genomics. Our definition of “Darwinian” was more
consistent with the so-called modern synthesis of evolution (sometimes also referred to as
“neo-Darwinism”), which is grounded in Darwin’s core ideas about variation and natural
selection, but updated with knowledge from subsequent discoveries, such as Mendelian
genetics (Huxley, 1942; Mayr, 1982). We acknowledge this oversight on our part and
appreciate the clarification. We are also aware that even this model of evolution is now
considered outdated (Gould, 2002); however, more recently discovered mechanisms (e.g.,
genetic drift) were beyond the scope of our focus on purpose-based inheritance reasoning
at the individual-organism level.
Second, Kampourakis points out that our use of “Lamarckian” to refer to so-called soft
inheritance (Mayr, 1980) is too restrictive because other biologists, including Darwin
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himself, considered the possibility of the inheritance of acquired traits. (Note, however,
that we did state that “other biologists before” Lamarck also believed this to be a key
mechanism in evolution [Ware & Gelman, 2014, p. 198].) Although this is correct, soft
inheritance is most commonly associated with Lamarck because this was a critical mech-
anism in his model (Bowler, 1983; Gould, 2002). Our use of “Lamarckian” (or the also
commonly used “Lamarckism”) is, therefore, consistent with the conventional use of this
term to refer to soft inheritance (Mayr, 1991). In contrast, although Darwin considered
the possibility of soft inheritance, this was only one of several mechanisms he considered,
and not one that he favored. He relied primarily on hard inheritance mechanisms by the
time he wrote The Origin of Species (Mayr, 1982, 1991). Thus, our alleged misuse of this
term, we believe, reflects a broader practice in the history of science literature.
Third, Kampourakis suggests that we use “teleological” too loosely when we refer to
explanations of inheritance that appeal to the necessity or purpose of a property as the
underlying mechanism, thereby making them inconsistent with modern evolutionary rea-
soning. Kampourakis emphasizes the distinction between design-based teleology (i.e.,
traits exist because they serve a purpose) and selection-based teleology (i.e., traits exist
because they serve a purpose that promotes survival, consequently leading the trait to be
selected within a species), only the former of which is inconsistent with evolutionary rea-
soning. To be clear, our paradigm focused on trait heritability at the individual-organism
level, not the species level, and, thus, on design-based teleological reasoning. Moreover,
it would have been inaccurate for participants to invoke selection-based teleological
explanations in this paradigm. That is, it would be incorrect to assume that individual off-
spring would inherit a particular trait solely because it had been selected over time within
a population as a result of its survival advantages—individual variation would still be
possible and the underlying mechanism for inheritance would be genetic material from
the parents, not survival advantages per se.
Nevertheless, Kampourakis raises an important point regarding the need to clarify how
one uses terms. Our use of the design-based sense of “teleological” stems from its typical
usage in the conceptual development literature to refer to explanations for objects and
natural phenomena in terms of the purposes that they serve. For example, Kelemen
(1999) argues that young children possess a promiscuous teleology, in which they view
objects of all sorts as being “made for” particular purposes (e.g., mountains exist for peo-
ple to climb on them). Thus, “teleological” in this sense refers to future-oriented reason-
ing in which the current function is thought to have caused an entity’s existence or
development. The design-based sense is also widely used in the science education
research when referring to the types of errors that students make in their evolutionary rea-
soning (e.g., Jensen & Finley, 1996; Settlage, 1994; Tamir & Zohar, 1991) and is often
used interchangeably with “need-based” (e.g., explaining that organisms acquire traits
because they need them to survive) (e.g., Kelemen & Rossett, 2009; Nehm & Ridgway,
2011; Rector, Nehm, & Pearl, 2012). In contrast, the selection-based sense of “teleology”
seems to appear more often in the history or philosophy of science literature (Lennox,
1993; Ruse, 2003; Wright, 1976), where it is often pointed out that it is compatible with
natural selection (and was accepted as such by Darwin).
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Perhaps the context in which it is most important (and most challenging) to distinguish
between these two senses of “teleology” is science education. The teleological errors that
students make typically involve attributing design-based mechanisms to selection, such as
failing to consider individual variation as the underlying cause for the emergence of a
trait (Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Ferrari & Chi, 1998; Tamir & Zohar, 1991). It has been
argued that students’ design-based teleological reasoning about evolution stems from a
broader design stance in which intentional agency is attributed to the creation and devel-
opment of both natural and human-made phenomena (Evans, 2000, 2001; Kelemen,
2012). Because of this general tendency, blind processes, such as individual variation in
natural selection, are likely to be misunderstood as intentional (Kelemen, Rottman, &
Seston, 2013; see also Lombrozo & Carey, 2006).
Thus, it is critical that science educators be trained to tease apart intuitive design-based
reasoning from mechanistic reasoning that accurately considers causal history. As we sug-
gested in our paper, one effective method may be to draw out students’ misconceptions
(e.g., design-based teleology) and clearly distinguish them from accurate evolutionary rea-
soning (see also Kampourakis & Zogza, 2009; Kelemen, 2012). In distinguishing between
design-based and selection-based teleology, it may be particularly important to focus on
causal laws, such as that an effect (function) cannot precede its cause (genetic factors
leading to the emergence of a trait) (Kampourakis & Zogza, 2009). However, it may be
better to avoid using “teleology” altogether to refer to selection-based processes, as it
inadvertently emphasizes function as the driving causal mechanism (Kelemen et al.,
2012; Mayr, 1982).
In conclusion, as shown in numerous studies (including our own), evolutionary concepts
are notoriously difficult to understand and talk about. The nuances between different theo-
ries and concepts are often subtle and easily misunderstood—so much so that even experts,
such as biology instructors, use imprecise language and concepts. Moreover, as this
exchange illustrates, there are misconceptions and inconsistencies in how these concepts are
discussed across disciplines. It is therefore fruitful to have these sorts of exchanges to
address disciplinary distinctions and commonalities. Prior research has shown that teaching
students about the history of evolutionary theory can facilitate more accurate evolutionary
reasoning (Jensen & Finley, 1995, 1996). We appreciate the history lesson this exchange
has prompted for us and hope that it encourages others to be mindful of how research in
other disciplines might inform their own thinking.
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